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NOTE
Face-to-Face With Facial Recognition Evidence:
Admissibility Under the Post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause
Joseph Clarke Celentino*
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court announced a major change
in Confrontation Clause doctrine, abandoning a decades-old framework that
focused on the common law principles of hearsay analysis: necessity and relia-
bility. The new doctrine, grounded in an originalist interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, requires courts to determine whether a particular statement is
testimonial. But the Court has struggled to present a coherent definition of the
term testimonial. In its subsequent decisions, the Court illustrated that its
new Confrontation Clause doctrine could be used to bar forensic evidence,
including laboratory test results, if the government failed to produce the tech-
nician who conducted the test. This Note explores the implications of Craw-
ford and its progeny through the lens of one piece of forensic evidence: facial
recognition technology. As facial recognition technology continues to gain
purchase as a law enforcement tool, prosecutors are increasingly likely to at-
tempt to introduce such evidence in court. Recognizing the interpretative diffi-
culty created by the deep divides that remain on the Court over the proper
scope of the Confrontation Clause, this Note argues that, under the Crawford
framework, facial recognition evidence is testimonial and, therefore, requires
confrontation.
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Introduction
On June 15, 2004, a jury deadlocked on rape charges brought by Massa-
chusetts prosecutors against Darrin Fernandez.1 DNA evidence connected
Darrin to semen recovered from the victim and Darrin had recently been
convicted of a break-in and another rape, both of which occurred in the
same neighborhood as the rape with which he was charged.2 The case
seemed straightforward. But the jury failed to reach a verdict because Darrin
had a twin brother, Damien Fernandez.3 A juror in Darrin’s trial told the
Boston Globe: “The fact that the DNA matches both identical twins created
some doubt in all of our minds . . . .”4 A second jury deadlocked several
months later.5 Prosecutors were eventually able to convict Darrin of the rape
1. Jonathan Saltzman, Rape Defendant’s DNA or That of His Twin? A Jury Deadlocks,
Boston Globe, June 16, 2004, www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2004/06/16/rape_defend
ants_dna_or_that_of_his_twin_a_jury_deadlocks/ [http://perma.cc/H3YB-SEZ2]. No direct
record of Fernandez’s conviction at the trial court level is accessible online, but a description
of the proceedings is available in his appeal to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. See Common-
wealth v. Fernandez, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 (2006).
2. Saltzman, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Matt Soniak, Double Trouble: When Identical Twins Run into the Law, Mental Floss
(Oct. 13, 2011, 10:11 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/28989/double-trouble-when-identi
cal-twins-run-law [http://perma.cc/W57R-5V6C].
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in 2006, only after presenting new evidence about his other crimes, includ-
ing the testimony of the earlier rape victim.6
DNA analysis has revolutionized criminal investigation and prosecution.
It has been used to secure thousands of convictions7 and hundreds of exon-
erations.8 And jurors put immense stock in forensic evidence, potentially
more than in eyewitness testimony.9
But such forensic evidence is by no means perfect. Samples of genetic
material may never be found10 or may be tainted.11 Even when tests are con-
ducted properly, analysts may disagree about the results.12 Fraud is possible,
particularly when the examiner knows the identities of all parties whose
6. Id.
7. Data on the exact number of convictions secured using DNA evidence are unavaila-
ble, but the existing data suggest thousands. See N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Ser-
vices, DNA—The Fingerprint of the 21st Century, http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/forensic/
index.htm [http://perma.cc/UD2F-D5HJ] (noting that, as of June 2012, the DNA Databank
has helped prosecutors obtain nearly 3,000 convictions). For data regarding the number of
publicly funded forensic crime laboratories that conduct DNA analysis, see, for example, Mat-
thew R. Durose et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Census of
Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2009 1 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/cpffcl09.pdf [http://perma.cc/S3HC-GWHN] (finding that 34 percent of the esti-
mated 4.1 million requests for forensic services received by publicly funded crime laboratories
were for the screening or DNA analysis of biological evidence). For an extensive discussion on
the use of DNA evidence for criminal justice, including use in court, see generally Nat’l
Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1996), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/166538NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2F6-R4HX].
8. Exonerated: Cases by the Numbers, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/04/justice/
prisoner-exonerations-facts-innocence-project/ [http://perma.cc/QC6W-WTLF].
9. CBS Poll: What To Believe?: Americans Trust Physical Evidence More Than Eyewitness
Testimony, CBS News (Jul. 7, 1998), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-poll-what-to-believe
[http://perma.cc/25E8-TZ55]. For a discussion of the reasons for this phenomenon, see gener-
ally William C. Thompson et al., Do Jurors Give Appropriate Weight to Forensic Identification
Evidence?, 10 J. Empirical L. Stud. 359, 390 (2013) (“[P]articipants assumed, when not told
otherwise, . . . that DNA evidence is extraordinarily reliable.”).
10. Naseam Rachel Behrouzfard, Strengths, Limitations, and Controversies of DNA Evi-
dence 1 S. New Eng. Roundtable Symp. L.J. 110, 120 (2006) (“Despite its powerful eviden-
tiary impact on the criminal justice system, DNA evidence is only found in a small fraction of
crime scenes.”).
11. See Daniel Vanek & Katja Drobnie`, Forensic DNA Typing and Quality Assurance, in
Forensic DNA Applications 205, 239–47 (Dragan Primorac & Moses Schanfield eds., 2014).
12. One experiment asked seventeen DNA experts at the same accredited governmental
laboratory to analyze actual DNA evidence from a gang rape case: only one of the experts
reached the same result as the expert who testified at the actual trial. Four found the results
inconclusive and twelve reached the opposite result. Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectiv-
ity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture Interpretation, 51 Sci. & Just. 204 (2011).
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samples are tested.13 The identical DNA of twins, although uncommon, may
thwart analysts.14
Facial recognition technology—that is, computer programs that can
identify a person based on a photograph or video still—may be able to pick
up where other types of forensic evidence leave off. Imagine that Darrin had
been caught on film breaking into any one of the three homes he was ulti-
mately found to have entered. Simply introducing a still image from this
video in court would suffer from some of the same deficiencies as DNA
evidence, because a jury would be equally unable to distinguish Darrin Fer-
nandez from Damien Fernandez. But a computer program can tell the dif-
ference; facial recognition technology can even distinguish between identical
twins.15 Had Darrin been caught on film, facial recognition evidence might
have positively identified him and saved significant prosecutorial and judi-
cial resources.16
Facial recognition technology is currently in widespread use and has
significant private and governmental applications.17 The technology is al-
ready used to identify suspects and solve crimes.18 As higher-quality cameras
13. See Nat’l Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States 187 (2009) (“[F]orensic practitioners who work in public crime laboratories often are
seen as part of the prosecution team, not as part of the scientific enterprise.”); William C.
Thompson, Tarnish on the “Gold Standard”: Understanding Recent Problems in Forensic DNA
Testing, Champion, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 10. The National Research Council authors also criticize
the fact that the majority of forensic science laboratories are administered by law enforcement
agencies, noting that this “leads to significant concerns related to the independence of the
laboratory and its budget.” Nat’l Research Council, supra, at 183–84.
14. Jess Bidgood, New DNA Test Sought in Identical Twin’s Rape Case, N.Y. Times (Sept.
15, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/us/new-dna-test-sought-in-identical-twins-
rape-case.html [http://perma.cc/AD92-MKBV] (“Because . . . identical twins[ ] come from a
single fertilized egg—the same genetic material—they cannot be distinguished by conventional
DNA testing, confounding prosecutors who might otherwise be able to build a solid case.”).
There are, though, some DNA analyses that are purportedly able to distinguish between identi-
cal twins. See id.
15. Although the effectiveness of facial recognition systems for distinguishing twins can
vary, some existing systems can, under ideal conditions, recognize the difference between iden-
tical twins with 90 percent confidence. See P. Jonathon Phillips et al., Distinguishing Identical
Twins by Face Recognition, http://www3.nd.edu/~kwb/PhillipsEtAlFG_2011.pdf [http://
perma.cc/PS94-HSD5].
16. There is significant need to conserve resources in these areas. Prosecutor’s offices are
frequently overworked. See, e.g., Lisa Rathke, Prosecutors: State’s Attorneys Offices Understaffed,
Burlington Free Press (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/lo
cal/2014/09/29/prosecutors-states-attorneys-offices-understaffed/16426881 [http://perma.cc/
J3QZ-9ESY]. For a discussion of the negative consequences overworking of prosecutor’s offices
can have for the administration of justice, see Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The
State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 261 (2011).
17. For example, the technology has been employed by the popular social networking site
Facebook. How Does Facebook Suggest Tags?, Facebook [hereinafter Facebook] https://
www.facebook.com/help/122175507864081 [http://perma.cc/U8AM-XSLN].
18. See Jose Pagliery, FBI Launches a Face Recognition System, CNN Money (Sept. 16,
2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/16/technology/security/fbi-facial-recognition [http://
perma.cc/4J25-R89V].
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become more cost effective and facial recognition algorithms become more
accurate,19 law enforcement agencies will seek to use facial recognition evi-
dence for more than just criminal investigation.20 After all, “[s]ome law en-
forcement agencies estimate that up to a quarter of complaint cases contain
face images of the suspect or an accomplice. This number is significantly
higher than for latent fingerprints or DNA samples.”21 Prosecutorial use is
therefore imminent.
But major hurdles still stand between facial recognition evidence and
the courtroom. For instance, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, scientific
evidence must be reliable and may require expert testimony to lay a suffi-
cient foundation.22 Because facial recognition evidence is relatively new,
criminal defendants will likely challenge its reliability.23
In addition to challenging facial recognition evidence under the rules of
evidence, criminal defendants may also invoke their constitutional right
under the Confrontation Clause to keep such evidence out of court. This is
especially likely given the Supreme Court’s recent strengthening of the pro-
tections provided by the Confrontation Clause, a major shift that began with
Crawford v. Washington24 in 2004.25
This Note seeks to define the relevant Confrontation Clause framework
for the use of facial recognition technology in court. Specifically, this Note
argues that facial recognition evidence is subject to the Sixth Amendment’s
procedural guarantee of confrontation. Part I explores the rapid develop-
ment of facial recognition technologies and the potential uses of those tech-
nologies in court. Part II presents the modern Confrontation Clause
framework and discusses the two basic requirements that must be met for
the Clause to apply to a piece of evidence: the evidence must be hearsay and
19. See Chaochao Lu & Xiaoou Tang, Surpassing Human-Level Face Verification Perform-
ance on LFW with GaussianFace, 29 AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 3811,
(2015), http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI15/paper/view/9845/9816 [perma.cc/
6FK8-CD3J] (demonstrating a facial recognition algorithm that can recognize faces with
greater accuracy than human subjects); Yana Welinder, Facing Real-Time Identification in Mo-
bile Apps & Wearable Computers, 30 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 89, 90–92 (2013) (discuss-
ing the proliferation of facial recognition mobile applications and their regulatory
implications).
20. For this reason, a significant area of scholarship has developed around the Fourth
Amendment issues surrounding facial recognition technology and other biometric identifiers.
E.g., Rudy Ng, Note, Catching Up to Our Biometric Future: Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights
and Biometric Identification Technology, 28 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 425 (2006).
21. Michael Petrov, MorphoTrust USA, Law Enforcement Applications of Fo-
rensic Face Recognition 3 (2012), http://www.planetbiometrics.com/creo_files/upload/arti
cle-files/whitepaper_facial_recognition_morphotrust.pdf [http://perma.cc/C7JZ-XQHH].
22. See John Nawara, Note, Machine Learning: Face Recognition Technology Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 49 U. Louisville L. Rev. 601, 604–07 (2011) (describing the standards for
admissibility of scientific evidence in federal court).
23. See Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703.
24. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
25. See infra Part II.
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the evidence must be testimonial. Part III argues that facial recognition evi-
dence meets both requirements and confrontation is thus required. This Part
also briefly explores several avenues prosecutors may use to admit facial rec-
ognition evidence if a court finds it testimonial.
I. The Ever-Increasing Use of Facial Recognition Technology
In 2001, surveillance cameras captured the faces of more than 100,000
football fans attending the Super Bowl as they entered Raymond James Sta-
dium in Tampa, Florida.26 Police used facial recognition technology on the
footage and were able to detect nineteen petty criminals, though they made
no arrests.27 Intended to test the counterterrorism ability of facial recogni-
tion, the Super Bowl program became one of the first highly publicized de-
ployments of facial recognition technology.28
Since this public debut in 2001, facial recognition technology use has
become common—both by private entities and government agencies.29 Po-
lice in both the United States and the United Kingdom already deploy auto-
mated facial recognition systems.30 The technology has proven an especially
effective tool for identifying and apprehending criminals. For example, “re-
searchers at Michigan State University were able to quickly identify one of
the Boston Marathon bombing suspects from law enforcement video . . . .”31
Indeed, facial recognition’s substantial law enforcement applications have
been a driving force behind the technology’s accelerated development.
26. Vickie Chachere, Biometrics Used to Detect Criminals at Super Bowl, ABC News (Feb.
13, 2002) http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=98871 [http://perma.cc/CAD5-95PG].
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., id.; Thomas C. Greene, Feds Use Biometrics Against Super Bowl Fans, The
Register (Feb. 7, 2001, 12:55 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/02/07/feds_use_bio
metrics_against_super/ [http://perma.cc/EXQ8-BPPR]; Patrick Marshall, We Can See Clearly
Now: After An Early Black Eye, Face Recognition Might Finally Be Ready for Prime Time, Gov’t
Computer News (June 4, 2007), http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/News/FaceRecog3.html [http://
perma.cc/BSJ7-EDFQ].
29. For examples of the crossover between private applications and government applica-
tions, see Nat’l Telecomm. and Info. Admin., Commercial Facial Recognition Technology: Pro-
posed Use Cases that Might Be Addressed by a Code of Conduct (Mar. 24, 2014), http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/stakeholder_use_cases_3_24_14.pdf [http://perma.cc/
SC4R-7ULQ].
30. E.g., Sebastian Anthony, UK, The World’s Most Surveilled State, Begins Using Auto-
mated Face Recognition to Catch Criminals, ExtremeTech (July 17, 2014, 8:03 AM), http://
www.extremetech.com/extreme/186435-uk-the-worlds-most-surveilled-state-begins-using-au
tomated-face-recognition-to-catch-criminals [http://perma.cc/KQ2X-YFAZ]; Thomasi Mc-
Donald, Raleigh Police Will Test Facial-Recognition Technology to Fight Crimes, News & Ob-
server (Sept. 18, 2014 9:12 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/09/18/4162497/raleigh-
police-department-adds.html [http://perma.cc/M35K-YJPP].
31. Mich. State Univ., Facial-Recognition Technology Proves its Mettle, ScienceDaily
(May 24, 2013), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130524142549.htm [http://perma.cc/
Y4FR-F6GF].
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This Part discusses the development of facial recognition technology
and its potential application in criminal proceedings. First, it chronicles ad-
vancements in the quality of facial recognition algorithms and the growth of
facial identification databases, highlighting the degree to which government
involvement and investment has been critical to the technology’s develop-
ment. Then, it describes potential courtroom applications of the technology,
many of which are already in use. Finally, it defines the steps in the imple-
mentation process of facial recognition technology in order to identify
which steps will be most relevant in the Confrontation Clause analysis.
A. A Rapidly Advancing Technology
Facial recognition technology has developed tremendously over the past
two decades. The algorithms for identification have increased dramatically
in accuracy and efficiency, and the databases containing facial information
have grown substantially. It is no accident that these developments enhance
the value of the technology for law enforcement purposes—as it is precisely
governmental entities that funded and facilitated the development of the
technology in the first place.
The United States government is intimately involved in the technology’s
development. In 1993, the Department of Defense’s Counterdrug Technol-
ogy Development Program sponsored the Face Recognition Technology
(FERET) program, which was designed to spur commercial applications of
the technology and create universal data standards.32 As part of continuing
efforts to integrate facial recognition systems, the federal government main-
tains a registry of recommended standards, and government use of facial
recognition remains common.33
Facial recognition technology has improved since the 1993 FERET Eval-
uation. The National Institute of Standards and Technology reported that, as
of 2010, error rates have dropped dramatically since the organization began
tracking the performance of facial recognition systems.34 Moreover, signifi-
cant advances have been made in the amount of processing time a system
requires to identify a match: the amount of physical space taken up by a
32. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, Face Recognition 4–6 (2006), http://www.biomet-
rics.gov/Documents/facerec.pdf [http://perma.cc/K4B7-TCAU]; see also P. Jonathon Phillips et
al., The FERET Evaluation Methodology for Face-Recognition Algorithms, 22 IEEE Transac-
tions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence 10 (2000), http://www.itl.nist.gov/
iad/humanid/feret/doc/FERET_PAMI_Oct_2000.pdf [http://perma.cc/3XYK-KTMH].
33. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, Registry of USG Recommended Biometric Stan-
dards (2014), http://www.biometrics.gov/standards/Registry_v5_2014_08_01.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5XLB-CXWD].
34. See P. Jonathon Phillips, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Next Challenge:
Human Level Robust Performance 8 (2012), http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/ibpc2012/
presentations/Day1/112_Phillips.pdf [http://perma.cc/XF3K-HPYS]; cf. John Markoff, Re-
searchers Announce Advance in Image-Recognition Software, N.Y. Times (Nov. 17, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/science/researchers-announce-breakthrough-in-content-recog
nition-software.html [http://perma.cc/5TPW-7BX6].
1324 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1317
“fac[ial] recognition server may be 10 times smaller than that of a finger-
print system with the same number of personal records and search
throughput. A single server computer can contain over 10 million records
with search time of less than 10 seconds.”35
Databases containing facial data have also grown. The prevalence of
photo and video technology, including camera phones, wearable devices
such as Google Glass, and closed circuit television (CCTV) systems, makes
data collection easier than ever before.36 Law enforcement agencies can lev-
erage the increased portability and affordability of image-capture technolo-
gies to grow their facial databases.37 In short, the chances that a crime will
either be caught on film or that a perpetrator’s facial data will be on file can
be expected to increase with time.
For example, in September 2014, the FBI’s Next Generation Identifica-
tion database went online.38 The database already contains over 100 million
records and includes an “Interstate Photo System” facial recognition ser-
vice.39 The system is accessible by over 18,000 law enforcement agencies.40
Also at the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security has begun
testing iris and facial recognition systems for use at international border
crossings41 while the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), for-
merly the United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technol-
ogy (US-VISIT) Program, has for years collected other biometric data about
foreigners entering the country.42 Many state law enforcement agencies
maintain similar databases, which they often compile using police mugshots
35. Petrov, supra note 21, at 12.
36. See Farhad Manjoo, In a World of Phones, Gadgets Must Adapt, N.Y. Times (Jan. 7,
2015), http://nyti.ms/1yAPjYf [http://perma.cc/M3CZ-UZ66].
37. See Jared Newman, Dubai Detectives Will Use Google Glass Facial Recognition Tech to
ID Criminals, PCWorld (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2691615/dubai-
detectives-will-use-google-glass-facial-recognition-tech-to-id-criminals.html [http://perma.cc/
ASU8-VFPY].
38. Press Release, FBI, FBI Announces Full Operational Capability of the Next Genera-
tion Identification System (Sept. 15, 2014) [hereinafter FBI Announces NGIS], http://
www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-announces-full-operational-capability-of-the-
next-generation-identification-system [http://perma.cc/LAC5-X58J].
39. Next Generation Identification: FBI Announces Biometrics Suite’s Full Operational Ca-
pability, FBI (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-announces-
biometrics-suites-full-operational-capability/fbi-announces-biometrics-suites-full-operational
-capability [http://perma.cc/MKC6-BYGZ].
40. FBI Announces NGIS, supra note 38.
41. Aliya Sternstein, New Facility Will Rehearse Foreigner Iris and Facial Recognition at
Airport Exits, Nextgov (June 27, 2014), http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2014/06/
new-facility-will-rehearse-foreigner-iris-and-facial-recognition-airport-exits/87502 [http://
perma.cc/M3NH-VTWT].
42. Office of Biometric Identity Management, Dep’t of Homeland Security, http://
www.dhs.gov/obim-biometric-identification-services [http://perma.cc/EBN9-B9BR].
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or driver’s license photos.43 The plethora of photographs that many Ameri-
cans publicly display on social media may also provide a fertile source for
database creation.44
As the government collects facial recognition data from an ever-increas-
ing number of sources, vast data repositories allow for more effective match-
ing.45 It is feasible that within a few decades, most Americans’ biometric
information will be logged in a government database.46 With increased
database comprehensiveness comes increased application for law enforce-
ment and criminal prosecution.47
B. Imminent Courtroom Applications
Facial recognition evidence has clear courtroom applications. Most sig-
nificantly, the evidence could be introduced to provide positive identifica-
tions of criminal suspects.48 Prosecutors may also seek to supplement in-
court identifications by witnesses with facial recognition evidence. Given the
well-documented deficiencies of eyewitness identifications,49 prosecutors
have good reason to offer additional evidence to a jury for verification.
Moreover, in cases where a photo or video provides the primary evidence
against a defendant, the prosecution may wish to introduce evidence of a
facial recognition match, rather than relying entirely on the jury’s determi-
nation of whether the defendant is the one pictured.50
43. See, e.g., Todd Strain & Monica Garske, Chula Vista Police Use New Facial Recognition
Technology, NBC 7 News San Diego (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/lo
cal/Chula-Vista-Police-Dept-New-Facial-Recognition-Technology-231835401.html [http://per
ma.cc/A8DP-S428]; Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, State Photo-ID Databases Become
Troves for Police, Wash. Post (June 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/tech
nology/state-photo-id-databases-become-troves-for-police/2013/06/16/6f014bd4-ced5-11e2-88
45-d970ccb04497_story.html [http://perma.cc/ ET3C-YYZ5].
44. Michael Schiffer, Commentary, My Face Or Yours? Exploring the Reality of Facial Rec-
ognition Tech, MediaPost (Sept. 10, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications
/article/182578/my-face-or-yours-exploring-the-reality-of-facial.html [http://perma-cc/7R6D-
U253]. Indeed, many social media platforms themselves already deploy facial recognition tech-
nology. E.g., Facebook, supra note 17.
45. Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 43.
46. Numerous privacy advocates have made this prediction. See, e.g., Jennifer Lynch, FBI
Plans to Have 52 Million Photos in Its NGI Face Recognition Database by Next Year, Electronic
Frontier Found. (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/fbi-plans-have-52-
million-photos-its-ngi-face-recognition-database-next-year [http://perma-cc/69SW-VG6X].
47. Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 43.
48. See, e.g., supra Introduction.
49. See generally Jennifer L. Devenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluat-
ing Commonsense Evaluations, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 338 (1997); Eyewitness Misidentifi-
cation, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-
Misidentification.php [http://perma-cc/5JQQ-BVNB] (noting that eyewitness misidentifica-
tion has played a role in “70% of convictions overturned through DNA testing”).
50. For an illustration of this type of application, consider the hypothetical use of facial
recognition technology in the Fernandez case, discussed supra in the Introduction.
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Facial recognition evidence will need to comport with a particular
court’s rules of evidence in order to be admissible. In federal court, all scien-
tific evidence must be evaluated for relevance and reliability.51 A party must
lay a proper foundation, which is frequently bolstered by the use of expert
testimony.52 While the admissibility of facial recognition evidence under the
rules of evidence is outside the scope of this Note, the technology’s increas-
ing accuracy and widespread use indicates that facial recognition evidence
will soon—if it does not already—satisfy the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.53
Finally, although facial recognition evidence has rarely been introduced
in a prosecution,54 it has already entered the court system. At least one
habeas petitioner has called for the use of facial recognition evidence as a
tool for exoneration.55 Moreover, the FBI is now training investigators
through the Facial Identification Scientific Working Group, the eventual
goal of which is “to create a facial examiner certification program similar to
that of fingerprint examiners.”56 Such substantial governmental investment,
coupled with the immense probative value of such evidence, suggests that
regular in-court use of facial recognition technology is imminent.
C. Key Features of Facial Recognition Technology
Before moving to an analysis of potential limitations the Confrontation
Clause imposes on the use of facial-recognition-technology evidence, this
Section outlines in detail the process through which facial recognition data
is developed and prepared for introduction as evidence. Because evidence
must contain the statement of a person—as opposed to merely machine-
generated data—to be considered hearsay57 and, therefore, to present a Con-
frontation Clause issue, this section specifically highlights human inputs in
the facial recognition process.
51. The inquiry usually proceeds under Fed. R. Evid. 104, 401, and 402.
52. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Federal courts evaluating the reliability of a scientific method
are guided by the factors announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
53. See Nawara, supra note 22, at 621 (“[Facial recognition evidence] passes muster
under both Frye and Daubert because it is reliable, relevant, and generally accepted by the
scientific community. It has the requisite reliability, but only barely. Until the technology be-
comes more widespread and accurate, it makes sense to open the door to its admissibility
slowly.”).
54. Petrov, supra note 21, at 15 (“Court presentations of 1:1 face identification results
are still rare.”).
55. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. State, 438 S.W.3d 909, 912 (Ark. 2014) (“In his petition . . .
appellant contended that testing of the videotape that showed the robbery . . . would reveal
that he was not the robber.”). The Arkansas Supreme Court ultimately rejected Hutcherson’s
claim that facial recognition technology would be able to exonerate him, but the ruling was
primarily based on the low quality of the video. The court’s discussion, however, suggests that
it is open to the use of facial recognition technology as a tool for exoneration. Id.
56. Petrov, supra note 21, at 15.
57. Discussed infra Section III.A.
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The process of capturing and coding facial recognition data can be dis-
tilled to five basic steps: (1) data collection, (2) transmission, (3) signal
processing, (4) decision, and (5) data storage.58
First, at the data-collection stage, facial data must be collected and en-
tered into the system. This can be accomplished in a number of ways, such
as through live collection using digital cameras or manual input of existing
photo or video data.59 The types of facial recognition evidence likely to be
introduced in court will almost definitely involve manual input because fully
automated facial recognition systems are neither sufficiently advanced nor
sufficiently integrated with existing photo and video capture devices to be
effective.60 Progress toward fully automated data collection and processing
remains the elusive goal of system developers. Current facial recognition
technology is most reliable in controlled settings—where lighting conditions
and angle are optimal—so human input at the data-collection stage is a
virtual prerequisite for effective processing.61 Specifically, human input is
frequently used after a photo or video is made to modify lighting conditions
and the subject’s angle or position relative to the camera.
Second, transmission of the facial recognition data may be required.
This is because some “systems collect data at one location but store and/or
process it at another.”62 During the transmission step, data may need to be
58. This model of analysis is drawn from the National Biometric Test Center. See James
L. Wayman, Fundamentals of Biometric Authentication Technologies (1999), re-
printed in National Biometric Test Center Collected Works 1997–2000 1, 6–9 (James L.
Wayman ed., 2000) (identifying the five subsystems of “a generic biometric authentication
system” as data collection, transmission, signal processing, decision, and data storage). Al-
though the National Biometric Test Center’s model describes biometric technologies generally,
it clearly applies to technology employed by the most common facial recognition systems. Cf.
Face Recognition – Technology Overview, Ex-Sight.Com (2009), http://www.ex-sight.com/
technology.htm [http://perma-cc/ L9VW-STFQ] (describing a four-stage process analogously,
using the terms capture, extraction, comparison, and matching).
59. See 2 MITRE Corp., Technology Assessment for the State of the Art Biomet-
rics Excellence Roadmap, FBI 1–3 (2009), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_
biometrics/biometric-center-of-excellence/files/saber_techassessmentvol2_v1_3_2009mar30
_delivered.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTY7-YFHW]. The differences between these multiple meth-
ods have no bearing on the Confrontation Clause analysis. This is because facial data from a
video is generally processed as a collection of still images.
60. See Stephen Andrew Mosca, Biometric Facial Recognition Software: How the Law
Should Treat Machines as Witnesses (2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.mosca-
law-firm.com/articles/BFRS.pdf [http://perma.cc/M92V-X89H] (“The deployments of auto-
mated technology may be considered experimental in nature, and do not yet rise to the level of
investigative or probative usefulness as evidence.”).
61. Lee Gomes, Videotape Can Help ID Terrorists, but Humans Must Still Do Scanning,
Wall St. J. (July 18, 2005 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112163882608787799
[perma.cc/WLZ6-CRN8] (“The current successful field applications of face recognition . . .
typically involve straight-on, passport-style photos in controlled settings where no effort is
being made to disguise the person’s facial features.”).
62. Wayman, supra note 58, at 7.
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compressed.63 Transmission can impact data quality64 and introduces an ad-
ditional possibility of error—whether technical or human—into the pro-
cess.65 For example, a human-introduced error could be transmitting the
wrong file type or the wrong file, while a technical error could be data cor-
ruption caused by the compression process. Whether and when transmis-
sion occurs will depend on the on-site technological capabilities and degree
of network integration that the facial recognition system employs.66
Third, during the signal-processing stage, raw facial data is processed
into a usable form. This process can be subdivided into three tasks—feature
extraction, quality control, and pattern matching67—requiring varying de-
grees of human involvement.
The precise method of feature extraction will depend on the type of
algorithm used, and thus this step may require more or less human input.68
Generally speaking, these algorithms operate by mapping data points on a
subject’s face and measuring vectors between these points.69 The goal of fea-
ture extraction is to isolate the “distinctive and repeatable” qualities of an
individual’s biometric pattern, while ignoring noise and imperfections in
the data collected.70
During pattern matching, the stored templates are compared against all
others already stored in the database. “[T]he pattern matching process com-
pares the present sample to multiple templates from the database one-at-a-
time, as instructed by the decision subsystem, sending on a quantitative ‘dis-
tance’ measure for each comparison.”71 Pattern matching also introduces a
significant possibility of error into the facial recognition process. This is be-
cause “distances will rarely, if ever, be zero as there will always be some non-
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, N.Y.U., The Center for Catastrophe
Preparedness & Response, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of Policy and Implementation
Issues 12, https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/facial_recognition_report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RB63-5X9Q] (suggesting that the final determination of a match will come
down to a human operator, which may make matching extremely difficult if the faces are of
different ethnic backgrounds than the operator).
66. Transmission may also occur after the signal processing stage, depending on the type
of system used. Wayman, supra note 58, at 7.
67. Id.
68. For a list of the most commonly used algorithms and a basic description of their
operation, see Mislav Grgic & Kresimir Delac, Algorithms, Face Recognition Homepage,
http://www.face-rec.org/algorithms [http://perma.cc/3V6Y-3Q9K].
69. See, e.g., id. (describing the Elastic Bunch Graph Matching algorithm); id. (“Faces are
represented as graphs, with nodes positioned at fiducial points. . . . Recognition is based on
labeled graphs. A labeled graph is a set of nodes connected by edges, nodes are labeled with
jets, edges are labeled with distances.”).
70. Wayman, supra note 58, at 7.
71. Id. at 8.
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repeatable biometric-, presentation-, sensor- or transmission-related varia-
tion remaining after processing.”72
Fourth, the decision subsystem looks for matches in a database of ex-
isting templates. “ ‘[M]atches’ or ‘non-matches’ [are determined] based on
the distance . . . measures received from the pattern matcher . . . .”73 Deci-
sions about the acceptable margin of error are “the most scientific aspect of
biometric evidence integrity,”74 and human input is most likely present in
systems that require the user to specify a distance measure.75 That is, it is
sometimes up to the analyst to decide on the acceptable level of precision
within which the results of the matching will be deemed conclusive.
Fifth, throughout the process, data must be stored. Storage represents an
additional avenue for human input in the facial recognition process because
increases in the number of stored templates necessitate additional decisions
about how matching occurs. As the number of templates contained in a
database increases, data will have to be partitioned into smaller subsets.76
Because partitioning can corrupt data, error rates will not remain constant
with increasing database size.77 “Consequently, database partitioning strate-
gies represent a complex policy decision[,]”78 one that requires human deci-
sionmaking and input to resolve. Partitioning choices will most likely be
made at the initial programming stage,79 but may also require input from
the forensic laboratory conducting the test or, perhaps, even the individual
technician involved in a particular case. At any rate, the partitioning choice
will certainly have an impact on the overall accuracy of the system80 and may
provide an avenue for attacking the validity of a piece of facial recognition
evidence.
Thus, while there is still a wide variation in the technologies and
processes used to implement facial recognition technology, nearly all of the
steps require some amount of human input and involvement, albeit to vary-
ing degrees. And, for the reasons described in Section III.A below, under-
standing the extent and nature of human involvement in the facial
72. James Wayman et al., An Introduction to Biometric Authentication Systems, in Bio-
metric Systems 1, 13 (James Wayman et al. eds., 2005).
73. Id. at 14.
74. Mosca, supra note 60, at 107.
75. Many facial recognition systems, however, contain pre-programmed values, fron-
tloading the decision onto the algorithm’s programmer, rather than the technician conducting
any individual analysis. E.g., First Line Facial Recognition Software, Facing Your First Line,
Blue Line Security Solutions 3 (2014), https://bluelinesecuritysolutions.com/images/
portfolioImages/First%20Line%20White%20Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/5QZU-LLED] (“First
Line facial detection is nothing more than a set of pre-programmed . . . variations of pixel
shading and positions that defines the location and sizes of human faces in digital images.”).
76. Wayman, supra note 58, at 9.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 8–9.
80. See id.
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recognition process is essential to considering the application of the Con-
frontation Clause to the introduction of such evidence.
II. Modern Confrontation Clause Doctrine
This Part surveys the modern Confrontation Clause framework in order
to set the stage for Part III’s discussion of its application to facial recognition
technology evidence. Under current doctrine, two basic requirements must
be met for the Clause to apply to a piece of evidence: the evidence must be
hearsay, and the evidence must be testimonial. Section II.A chronicles the
history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Clause, summarizing
the major changes introduced in the landmark case of Crawford v. Washing-
ton.81 Section II.B analyzes the questions left open by the Crawford Court,
specifically addressing the distinction between testimonial and nontestimo-
nial evidence. Section II.C describes the threshold matter of whether the
evidence in question is hearsay.
A. Historical Confrontation Clause Interpretation and Crawford’s
Contribution
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”82 The precise contours
of the protection afforded by the Confrontation Clause have developed pri-
marily through case law in the last fifty years.83 Specifically, the Supreme
Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence can be broadly grouped into
two major eras: the “Roberts Era” and the modern “Crawford Era.”84
1. Before Crawford
In the Roberts Era, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence focused on the
necessity and reliability of hearsay evidence. The Ohio v. Roberts Court an-
nounced that, in order to introduce an out-of-court statement that would
not be subject to cross-examination, a prosecutor would have to establish
81. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
82. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
83. 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:26
(4th ed. 2013) (“[M]ost of what we can call the law of confrontation comes from Supreme
Court decisions handed down after 1965.”).
84. See George Fisher, Evidence 588–90, 594 (3d ed. 2013). Fisher also mentions the
“Mattox Era,” during which the Court rejected the argument that the Confrontation Clause
merely codified historical hearsay rules and exceptions, id., and held that that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Confrontation Clause against the states,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). Because the first comprehensive doctrinal frame-
work arose during the Roberts Era, this Note does not discuss the Mattox Era at length.
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both necessity—the unavailability of the person who made the hearsay state-
ment at issue85—and “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ ”86 According to the
Court, “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evi-
dence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evi-
dence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”87 Thus, the primary concern of Roberts Era
courts was whether a given statement was sufficiently reliable to allow ad-
mission absent face-to-face confrontation.
But this framework began to unwind in the 1990s as jurists and scholars
began to embrace a more historical approach to the Confrontation Clause.88
Justices Thomas and Scalia, concurring in White v. Illinois, indicated their
willingness to reconsider Roberts in 1992.89 Justice Thomas wrote: “Relevant
historical sources and our own earlier decisions, nonetheless, suggest that a
narrower reading of the Clause than the one given to it since [Roberts] may
well be correct.”90 Justice Breyer also joined this coalition, concurring in Lilly
v. Virginia.91 The death knell for the Roberts framework finally came in
Crawford v. Washington,92 marking the beginning of modern Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence.
2. Crawford v. Washington
Michael Crawford was arrested on August 5, 1999 for stabbing Kenneth
Lee.93 After receiving his Miranda warning, Crawford told police that he ac-
ted in self-defense during a fight at Lee’s apartment.94 Crawford’s wife, Syl-
via, largely corroborated his description of the events but her statement
tended to discredit Crawford’s claim that the victim had a weapon drawn
85. 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (“In the usual case . . . the prosecution must either produce,
or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the
defendant.”), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
86. Id. at 66.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo.
L.J. 1011 (1998) (explaining that reliability and truth determinations are poor criteria to gov-
ern application of the Confrontation Clause and that a narrow understanding of the confron-
tation right best comports with the language and theory of the Clause); see also Margaret A.
Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial
Restraint Model, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 557 (1992) (arguing that treating hearsay statements created
without governmental intrusion differently than hearsay statements procured by agents of the
prosecution is more in line with the meaning and text of the Sixth Amendment).
89. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
90. White, 502 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91. 527 U.S. 116, 140–41 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Viewed in light of its tradi-
tional purposes, the [Roberts] hearsay-based Confrontation Clause test . . . is both too narrow
and too broad.”).
92. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
93. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
94. Id. at 38–39.
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when Crawford stabbed him.95 Crawford was charged with assault and at-
tempted murder in Washington state court.96 Sylvia refused to testify at the
trial, asserting spousal privilege.97 Prosecutors invoked a state law hearsay
exception and admitted a recording and transcript of Sylvia’s statement over
Crawford’s objection.98 The Washington Supreme Court found that Sylvia’s
statement “bore guarantees of trustworthiness,” making it admissible under
Roberts.99
The Supreme Court overruled Roberts100 and announced a new frame-
work for evaluating out-of-court statements under the Confrontation
Clause.101 The Court held that Sylvia’s statements were inadmissible, because
they were testimonial in nature.102 The opinion, penned by Justice Scalia,
was grounded in a historical analysis of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion practices in common law courts,103 with a special focus on systems used
in the colonies around the time of the founding.104 Rather than just reflect-
ing historical hearsay prohibitions, the Confrontation Clause “applies to
‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testi-
mony.’ ”105 Citing the 1828 edition of Noah Webster’s An American Diction-
ary of the English Language, the Court defined “testimony” as “[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact.”106
The Confrontation Clause, the Court concluded, “commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner:
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”107 And while “the Clause’s
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence . . . it is a procedural rather
95. Id. at 39–40.
96. Id. at 40.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 40–41.
99. Id. at 41–42 (citing State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002)).
100. Although the Crawford majority did not explicitly overturn Roberts, the Court’s anal-
ysis clearly indicates an abrogation of the doctrine. See id. at 62 (“The Roberts test . . . replaces
the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one.”).
The Court explicitly acknowledged its abrogation of Roberts in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S.
406, 413 (2007) (“While this appeal was pending, we issued our opinion in Crawford, in which
we overruled Roberts . . . .”).
101. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69.
102. Id. at 68 (“In this case, the State admitted Sylvia’s testimonial statement against peti-
tioner, despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine her. That alone is suffi-
cient to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment.”).
103. Id. at 43–50 (“The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to
adversarial testing . . . .”).
104. See id. at 48 (“Many declarations of rights adopted around the time of the Revolution
guaranteed a right of confrontation.”).
105. Id. at 51.
106. Id. (citing 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language
(New York, S. Converse 1828)).
107. Crawford, 541U.S. at 61.
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than a substantive guarantee.”108 The Crawford Court thus held that the
Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify and the de-
fendant previously had an opportunity for cross-examination.109
Although it was not explicit in Crawford, the Court subsequently ruled
in Whorton v. Bockting that the Clause does not apply to nontestimonial
out-of-court statements.110 Thus, whether a statement is characterized as tes-
timonial is critical. Testimonial statements fall within the Sixth Amend-
ment’s guarantees and require confrontation. Nontestimonial statements, in
contrast, are subject only to the prohibitions of either state or federal rules
of evidence.111
Today, prosecutors seeking to admit hearsay evidence over a defendant’s
assertion of her right to confrontation must show that the evidence is non-
testimonial. If the prosecutor succeeds, the Clause poses no bar, and the
court may admit the evidence if it falls within a traditional hearsay excep-
tion.112 If the evidence is deemed testimonial, however, the defendant’s right
to confrontation attaches, and the evidence is generally barred113 if the pros-
ecutor is unable to produce the declarant in court.114
B. The Ambiguous Meaning of Testimonial Post-Crawford
Although the Crawford Court unambiguously effected a major change
in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it shed little light on what types of
statements are testimonial. As Justice Scalia frankly acknowledged, “our re-
fusal to articulate a comprehensive definition in this case will cause interim
uncertainty.”115 Indeed, it has.116
108. Id.
109. Id. at 53–54.
110. 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007).
111. See Fisher, supra note 84, at 674–78.
112. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
113. But see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (“Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from
trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 353–54, 359
(2008) (holding that a defendant forfeits his right to confrontation where “the defendant en-
gaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying”).
114. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial
statements.” (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).
115. Id. at 68 n.10.
116. State and federal courts have grappled with Crawford’s polysemy. See, e.g., United
States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 651 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding that child pornography traffick-
ing tips passed to law enforcement were testimonial); United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219,
221 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that coconspirators’ guilty plea allocutions against defendants were
testimonial). Indeed, lower courts analyzing or applying Crawford have sometimes reached
wildly divergent results. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511 (2005) (describing conflicts
among lower courts and collecting cases). Wary of these inconsistencies, this Note focuses
almost exclusively on the Supreme Court’s own interpretations and case law.
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1. The Primary Purpose Test
The first clue as to the meaning of testimonial came in Davis v. Washing-
ton,117 where the Court introduced a test based on the “primary purpose” of
the statement. The Court’s opinion addressed two consolidated cases involv-
ing statements made by domestic abuse victims to police. In one case, the
statements were made to a 911 emergency operator before police arrived.118
In the other, the statements were made to police responding to a 911 call
placed minutes before.119 In the consolidated opinion, captioned Davis v.
Washington, Justice Scalia wrote:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interro-
gation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emer-
gency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate
that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.120
The declarant’s primary purpose for making a statement has remained the
cornerstone of Confrontation Clause analysis, informing all of the Court’s
subsequent cases.121
While the primary purpose test itself could have provided a workable
standard, it soon became clear that the Court remained deeply divided
about its application.122 The most pertinent split of opinion for the purposes
of this Note is between Justice Sotomayor and the late Justice Scalia.
117. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
118. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 849 (Wash. 2005).
119. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 450 (Ind. 2005).
120. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (emphasis added).
121. This test is referenced in all of the Court’s subsequent Confrontation Clause cases.
E.g., Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (“[T]he question is whether, in light of all the
circumstances, viewed objectively, the ‘primary purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘creat[e] an
out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011))); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (2012) (“[T]he Cellmark
report’s primary purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain
evidence for use against petitioner . . . .” (emphasis added)); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344,
349 (2011) (“[T]he ‘primary purpose of the interrogation’ was ‘to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822)).
122. Justice Thomas has consistently rejected the primary purpose test. Instead, he be-
lieves that the testimonial nature of a statement is determined not by the purpose for which
the statement was made, but by the solemnity with which it was made. Davis, 547 U.S. at 836
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he plain terms of the ‘testimony’ definition we endorsed [in
Crawford] necessarily require some degree of solemnity before a statement can be deemed
‘testimonial.’ ”). Because Justice Thomas’s views have been rejected by all the other Justices,
they are not addressed in this Note. See generally Paul F. Rothstein, Unwrapping the Box the
Supreme Court Justices Have Gotten Themselves Into: Internal Confrontations Over Confronting
the Confrontation Clause, 58 How. L.J. 479 (2015) (noting that Justice Thomas has consistently
filed concurring or dissenting opinions in Confrontation Clause cases based on his own ratio-
nales or theories).
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Justice Sotomayor would look to the objective purpose of the statement,
defined in reference to the surrounding circumstances. As she wrote for the
Court in Michigan v. Bryant: “[T]he relevant inquiry is . . . the purpose that
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’
statements and actions and the circumstances . . . .”123
Justice Scalia, in contrast, focused on the declarant’s subjective intent:
“[T]he declarant must intend the statement to be a solemn declaration . . .
and he must make the statement with the understanding that it may be used
to invoke the coercive machinery of the State against the accused.”124
In its most recent Confrontation Clause case, the Court appeared to
settle on the objective-circumstances iteration of the primary purpose test.
Ohio v. Clark addressed whether statements indicating child abuse made by
a three-year-old child to his teacher and a social worker were testimonial.125
Concluding that they were not,126 the Court relied heavily on language in
Davis and Bryant, writing that “[i]n the end, the question is whether, in
light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the ‘primary purpose’ of
the conversation was to ‘creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony.’ ”127
The statements were nontestimonial in light of both the ongoing emer-
gency involving suspected child abuse and the unlikelihood that the child
declarant intended the statements to his teachers to be used by the police or
prosecutors. “[C]onsidering all the relevant circumstances here, [the vic-
tim’s] statements clearly were not made with the primary purpose of creat-
ing evidence for Clark’s prosecution,” the Court wrote.128
In Section III.B.1, this Note applies the primary purpose test to facial
recognition evidence and concludes that, under either the objective or sub-
jective primary purpose test, facial recognition technology is testimonial.
2. Application to Forensic Laboratory Reports
The Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence surrounding forensic
laboratory reports is particularly noteworthy in light of such reports’ paral-
lels to facial recognition evidence. In short, forensic laboratory reports con-
taining an analyst’s statement about the results of a scientific test are
testimonial under Crawford, according to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts129
and Bullcoming v. New Mexico.130
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court addressed for the first time
whether reports containing the results of a forensic analysis were testimonial
123. 562 U.S. at 360.
124. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
125. 135 S. Ct. at 2177–81.
126. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183.
127. Id. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358).
128. Id. at 2181.
129. See 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009).
130. See 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011).
1336 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1317
statements requiring confrontation.131 During Luis Melendez-Diaz’s prose-
cution on charges of cocaine distribution and trafficking, the State intro-
duced bags of powder seized during arrest and “three ‘certificates of analysis’
showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on the seized sub-
stances,” which reported that the bags contained cocaine.132 Analysts at the
State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
who had tested the bags swore to the content of the certificates before a
notary public.133 After a jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty, he appealed, argu-
ing that admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the analysts who performed the tests.134
The Melendez-Diaz Court expressed little doubt that the documents at
issue fell “within the ‘core class of testimonial statements.’ ”135 The so-called
certificates were, in fact, affidavits, a category of documents explicitly covered
under Crawford.136 Justice Scalia noted that the certificates “are functionally
identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on
direct examination.’ ”137 Because the certificates were testimonial, the labora-
tory analysts were witnesses for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment,
whom Melendez-Diaz was entitled to confront.138
Building on Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court again addressed the
Confrontation Clause’s requirements regarding a forensic lab report in
Bullcoming v. New Mexico.139 At Donald Bullcoming’s trial for driving while
intoxicated, the prosecution offered a forensic laboratory report certifying
that his blood-alcohol concentration was well above the threshold for aggra-
vated DWI.140 Curtis Caylor, the analyst at the New Mexico Department of
Health who tested Bullcoming’s blood sample, had recently been placed on
unpaid leave and did not testify at Bullcoming’s trial.141 Instead, the State
attempted to introduce Caylor’s finding “as a ‘business record’ during the
testimony of . . . a[ ] [state laboratory] scientist who had neither observed
nor reviewed Caylor’s analysis.”142 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
131. 557 U.S. at 305.
132. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 309.
135. Id. at 310 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
136. Id. at 310.
137. Id. at 310–11 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
138. Justice Scalia did clarify one important limitation on the Court’s holding, however:
“[I]t is not the case[ ] that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain
of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person
as part of the prosecution’s case.” Id. at 311 n.1. The Melendez-Diaz Court noted that “gaps in
the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)).
139. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
140. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.
141. Id. at 2712.
142. Id.
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address whether the prosecution could introduce a testimonial forensic lab-
oratory report through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not
sign the certification or personally perform or observe the test.143
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 5–4 majority, confirmed that the re-
port was testimonial and held that “[t]he accused’s right is to be confronted
with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable
at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that
particular scientist.”144 Relying heavily on its analysis in Melendez-Diaz, the
Supreme Court rejected New Mexico’s argument that Caylor’s status as “an
‘independent scientis[t]’ [acting] ‘according to a non-adversarial public
duty’ ” rendered the statements nontestimonial.145
Specifically, the Court held that “[a] document created solely for an
‘evidentiary purpose’ . . . made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as
testimonial.”146 Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s view that Caylor
was a mere scrivener147 was in error. It made no difference, the Court ruled,
that the analysts’ findings in Melendez-Diaz were contained in certificates
that were sworn to before a notary public148 while Caylor’s findings were not
notarized. The Court thus determined that Bullcoming’s Sixth Amendment
rights had been violated.149
Bullcoming is particularly important to understanding how the Con-
frontation Clause applies to facial recognition technology for three reasons.
First, the Court refined its analysis of forensic laboratory reports and explic-
itly rejected the argument that the laboratory analyst was a mere scrivener.150
Second, the Court insisted that neither the perceived reliability of evidence151
nor the prosecutorial inconvenience that confrontation creates should bear
on resolution of the constitutional question.152 Finally, the Bullcoming Court
concluded that the “analyst who must testify is the person who signed the
certificate,”153 clarifying the process that prosecutors must use to satisfy a
defendant’s right to confrontation and preventing a possible end run around
Melendez-Diaz.
143. Id. at 2710.
144. Id. at 2709–10 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 2717 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 32–33, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No.
09-10876), 2011 WL 108378, at *32–33).
146. Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009)).
147. Id. at 2713.
148. Id. at 2717 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009)).
149. See id. at 2719.
150. Id. at 2710, 2713.
151. Id. at 2715 (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report drawn
from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.”).
152. Id. at 2717–18 (“The constitutional requirement, we reiterate, ‘may not [be] disre-
gard[ed] . . . at our convenience.’ ” (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
325 (2009)).
153. Id. at 2716 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 334 (2009) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting)).
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Thus, Melendez-Diaz provides the basic rule: the Confrontation Clause
applies to lab reports. And Bullcoming prescribes the presumptive means of
introduction: prosecutors must produce the forensic analyst who conducted
the particular test.
The Court’s most recent forensic laboratory report case, however, mud-
died the waters. In Williams v. Illinois,154 the police sent a rape kit taken from
a victim to Cellmark, an outside laboratory. Cellmark returned a male DNA
profile155 contained in a report signed by two analysts.156 Sandra Lambatos, a
forensic analyst with the Illinois State Police, subsequently used the profile
produced by Cellmark to search a state DNA database.157 The electronic
database returned a match to Sandy Williams, who had given a sample of
blood when he was arrested on unrelated charges in 2000.158 Before
Lambatos’s search, police had not identified a suspect.159
Like the report in Bullcoming, the Cellmark analysis described the rele-
vant samples, test methodology, and results and included the signatures of
the laboratory officials who conducted the test.160 Unlike Melendez-Diaz or
Bullcoming, however, the prosecution did not attempt to admit the report
into evidence.161 Instead, Lambatos testified as an expert, stating that she
used the Cellmark report to formulate her independent opinion that Wil-
liams’s DNA matched that of the DNA profile contained within the
report.162
The Williams case resulted in a total of four separate opinions, advocat-
ing three conflicting viewpoints.163 The plurality opinion, penned by Justice
Alito, held that there was no Confrontation Clause violation, offering two
important rationales: (1) all references to the report “either were not hearsay
or were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,”164 and (2) even if it
had been introduced for its truth, the Cellmark report was not testimonial
154. 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012).
155. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230.
156. Id. at 2266–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2229 (plurality opinion).
158. Id.
159. See id. (noting that Williams, the only suspect, was identified and indicted following
the results of Lambatos’s search).
160. Id. at 2267 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
161. Compare id. at 2230 (plurality opinion), with Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct.
2705, 2719 (2011), and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309 (2009).
162. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230 (“Lambatos confirmed that she did not conduct or ob-
serve any of the testing on the vaginal swabs, and that her testimony relied on the DNA profile
produced by Cellmark.”).
163. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer joined the plurality. Justice
Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, but joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full. Justice Thomas
concurred in the judgment but offered a vastly different rationale for his result. Justice Kagan
penned the dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Id. at 2227.
164. Id. at 2224.
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because it lacked “the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of
engaging in criminal conduct.”165
In regard to the primary purpose question, the plurality stated that the
reports were nontestimonial, placing significant weight on the fact that the
Cellmark technicians only produced an anonymous DNA profile, rather
than identifying a particular suspect.166 According to Justice Alito, the pri-
mary purpose of the state crime lab in sending the sample to Cellmark was
to “catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large,”167 rather than to obtain
evidence for trial. “Similarly, no one at Cellmark could have possibly known
that the profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate petitioner—or
for that matter, anyone whose DNA profile was in the law enforcement
database.”168 These differences, bolstered by the presumed reliability of the
evidence,169 led the plurality to conclude that the report fell outside the pro-
tection of the Confrontation Clause.170
Writing a sternly worded opinion for the four-justice dissent, Justice
Kagan was quick to attack the precedential value of the plurality’s holding: “I
call Justice Alito’s opinion ‘the plurality,’ because that is the conventional
term for it. But in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dissent: Five
Justices specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph
of its explication.”171
Justice Kagan went on to reject the plurality’s targeted individual test as
contrary to the Confrontation Clause’s text, history, and precedents.172 In-
deed, Melendez-Diaz had already rejected the argument that a laboratory
analyst’s statement must be accusatory in order to be testimonial:173 “None
of our cases has ever suggested that . . . the statement must be meant to
accuse a previously identified individual . . . .”174
Finally, the dissent lamented the confusion caused by the plurality:
“What comes out of four Justices’ desire to limit Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming in whatever way possible, combined with one Justice’s one-jus-
tice view of those holdings, is—to be frank—who knows what.”175 Kagan
concluded that “until a majority of this Court reverses or confines
[Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming], I would understand them as continuing to
165. Id. at 2225 (emphasis added). This second rationale is discussed in Section II.C.
166. Id. at 2243–44.
167. Id. at 2243.
168. Id. at 2243–44.
169. See id. at 2244 (noting the lack of “incentive to produce anything other than a scien-
tifically sound and reliable profile”).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2273 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
173. Id. at 2274; see also infra note 223 and accompanying text.
174. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2277.
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govern, in every particular, the admission of forensic evidence.”176 The prec-
edential effect of Williams has thus generated substantial confusion among
lower courts,177 and some have even disregarded the opinion entirely.178
C. The Hearsay Requirement
Embedded in the testimonial analysis is an additional requirement: the
evidence in question must be hearsay. Although the Crawford Court did not
treat the issue at length, the Court “explicitly noted that its exclusionary rule
does not apply when testimonial statements are introduced for some pur-
pose other than establishing ‘the truth of the matter asserted.’ ”179 But, de-
spite the limited discussion of the hearsay prerequisite in Crawford,
numerous scholars and the Court’s subsequent decisions confirm that the
Confrontation Clause only applies to hearsay evidence—that is, evidence of-
fered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein.180
The Court grappled with the hearsay requirement in Williams v. Illi-
nois.181 As described in Section II.B.2 above, the prosecution in Williams did
not attempt to admit the DNA report into evidence. Instead, it called an
expert to testify. Lambatos stated that she used the Cellmark lab report to
formulate her independent opinion that Williams’s DNA matched that of
the DNA profile contained within the report.182 She also testified about the
general process of generating DNA profiles from forensic samples and as-
serted that Cellmark was an “accredited crime lab” that regularly conducted
testing on samples sent by state police.183 Critically, “Lambatos confirmed
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he diver-
gent analyses and conclusions of the [Williams] plurality and dissent sow confusion as to
precisely what limitations the Confrontation Clause may impose when an expert witness testi-
fies about the results of testing performed by another analyst . . . .”); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d
648, 666 (N.J. 2014) (“We find Williams’s force, as precedent, at best unclear.”).
178. E.g., State v. Norton, 117 A.3d 1055, 1071 (Md. 2015) (noting that some state su-
preme courts “have declined to apply Williams”); Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 184
(D.C. 2013) (“The Supreme Court’s most recent Confrontation Clause case has not provided
any clarity.”); id. at 189 (“We therefore conclude that Williams produces no new rule of
law . . . .”).
179. Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Con-
frontation Clause, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 113 (2013) (quoting People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d
268, 277 (Ill. 2010), aff’d Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012)). Surprisingly, the Craw-
ford Court’s only mention of this crucial point was contained parenthetically in a footnote:
“The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than estab-
lishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004)
(citation omitted).
180. See, e.g., 12 Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 33:351 (West 2010) (“[T]he
Confrontation Clause does not require exclusion of all out-of-court statements, and it does not
affect the admissibility of statements which are not hearsay, such as out-of-court statements
not offered as truth of the matter asserted.”).
181. 132 S. Ct. at 2221.
182. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230.
183. Id.
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that she did not conduct or observe any of the testing on the vaginal swabs,
and that her testimony relied on the DNA profile produced by Cellmark.”184
Regarding hearsay, the plurality concluded that Lambatos’s testimony
was not offered to prove that the matching DNA profile was found in the
vaginal swabs taken from the victim. “Rather, that fact was a mere premise
of the prosecutor’s question[ing], and Lambatos simply assumed that pre-
mise to be true when she gave her answer indicating that there was a match
between the two DNA profiles.”185 Other evidence—such as the fact that the
Cellmark profile matched Williams, whom the victim identified as her at-
tacker—not Lambatos’s testimony, provided the necessary inferences about
chain of custody.186
The dissent argued that the prosecution had offered the Cellmark report
for its truth by implicitly asking the jury to assume its veracity when assess-
ing Lambatos’s opinion. When a witness repeats an out-of-court statement
as the basis for a conclusion, Kagan wrote, the conclusion’s utility depends
on the statement’s truth.187 Bringing the number of Justices in support of the
dissent’s reasoning to five, Justice Thomas wrote that “[t]here is no mean-
ingful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement so that the
factfinder may evaluate the expert’s opinion and disclosing that statement
for its truth.”188
The discussion of hearsay in the Williams case offers two major insights
that bear directly on this Note. First, all nine Justices agreed that the Con-
frontation Clause only applies when testimonial statements are offered for the
truth of the matter asserted—that is, when they are hearsay.189 Thus, any
cogent Confrontation Clause analysis must consider whether the evidence is
hearsay. This Note addresses hearsay as a preliminary question in Section
III.A, arguing that all facial recognition evidence likely to be used in court
today constitutes hearsay. This analysis paves the way for this Note’s conclu-
sion that facial recognition evidence is testimonial in nature and thus falls
within the protection of the Confrontation Clause. Second, the non-hearsay
purpose proposed by the plurality in Williams—namely, forming the basis
for an expert opinion—has not been foreclosed by existing Supreme Court
precedent. This Note concludes in Section III.A.2, however, that Williams’s
precedential value in this regard is limited and, in any event, is unlikely to be
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2236.
186. Id. at 2238.
187. Id. at 2268–69 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring).
189. Id. at 2235 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of
testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.’ ”
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59–60 n.9 (2004)); id. at 2245 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Clause “concerns out-of-court statements admitted for their
truth”); id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting the same portion of Crawford as the
plurality); id. at 2268 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting the same portion of Crawford as the
plurality).
1342 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1317
invoked by prosecutors seeking to admit facial recognition evidence because
of the technology’s unique features.
III. Facial Recognition Evidence Requires Confrontation
This Part argues that, in light of the Supreme Court’s precedents post-
Crawford, the Confrontation Clause will apply to most facial recognition
evidence offered against criminal defendants because such evidence is al-
most always hearsay and is testimonial in nature. As a result, a defendant’s
right of confrontation will have to be satisfied in order for such evidence to
be introduced in court. Section III.A demonstrates that, under the circum-
stances most likely to be seen in court, facial recognition evidence contains
hearsay. Section III.B shows that facial recognition evidence is testimonial.
Section III.C briefly reviews the implications of testimonial status on the
admissibility of facial recognition evidence.
A. Facial Recognition Evidence is Hearsay
In order to trigger Crawford’s testimonial analysis, a court must deem
the evidence hearsay, which requires a determination of whether a statement
of a person is offered for its truth. The five basic units of a facial recognition
test—described in Section I.C above—thus drive the first step of the Con-
frontation Clause inquiry. All facial recognition evidence likely to be used in
court today constitutes hearsay because it (1) contains the statements of the
laboratory technician who conducted the analysis and (2) will almost always
be offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted
therein.
1. Facial Recognition Evidence Will Usually Contain Statements of the
Laboratory Technician Who Conducted the Analysis
Though facial recognition evidence operates behind a scrim of automa-
tion, the hearsay rules require us to mind the man or woman behind the
curtain. Indeed, for the overwhelming majority of facial recognition systems,
the data-collection and decision stages require the incorporation of human
statements—that is, the inputs of actual people. The presence of these
human statements, when offered to prove their truth, render the laboratory
reports hearsay.190
To see why this is so, it is useful to look at a small subcategory of facial
recognition systems that arguably do not contain human statements. Fully
automated facial recognition systems automatically extract facial data from
live-streaming video and conduct a comparison and matching analysis in
190. See Section II.C above for a discussion of the role of hearsay in the Confrontation
Clause analysis, and Section III.A.2 below for a discussion of how facial recognition evidence
will almost always be offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted.
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real time.191 Fully automated systems likely fall outside the scope of the Con-
frontation Clause because such purely machine-generated information may
not constitute the statement of a person, as is required to constitute hearsay.
This reasoning, which draws on the definition of hearsay contained in
Federal Rule of Evidence 801, was summarized most concisely by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals:
[Hearsay] is understood to be “a statement, other than the one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.” “A declarant is a person who makes
a statement.” And a “statement” . . . is an “(1) oral or written assertion or
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion.” Only a person may be a declarant and make a statement. Ac-
cordingly, “nothing ‘said’ by a machine . . . is [hearsay].”192
The Fourth Circuit went on to hold that “[a]ny concerns about the reliabil-
ity of such machine-generated information is [sic] addressed through the
process of authentication not by hearsay or Confrontation Clause
analysis.”193
The rule that a statement must be made by a person in order to consti-
tute hearsay is fundamental to this Note’s Confrontation Clause analysis.
When human input is involved in the facial recognition process, this prereq-
uisite to hearsay status is satisfied.
Take, for example, the manipulation of photo or video evidence at the
data-collection stage.194 When an automated system processes data collected
from a constantly running video feed, absent human input, it is the com-
puter itself that generates a statement. Using the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning,
such “[e]vidence is computer-generated, and therefore not hearsay, if it ‘in-
volve[s] so little intervention by humans in [its] generation as to leave no
doubt that [it is] wholly machine-generated for all practical purposes.’ ”195
191. See, e.g., supra Section I.C.
192. United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 557 U.S.
934 (2009) (second omission in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Fed. R. Evid.
801(a)–(c); then quoting 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal
Evidence § 380 (2d ed. 1994)).
193. Washington, 498 F.3d at 231.
194. See, e.g., Petrov, supra note 21, at 13–14 (describing a software application that
allows data manipulation on the “front end for forensic searches”).
195. Erick J. Poorbaugh, Note, Interfacing Your Accuser: Computerized Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause Following Melendez-Diaz, 23 Regent U. L. Rev. 213, 222–23 (2010)
(quoting United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263 n.23 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also Susan
E.E.B. Sherman, “I Object . . . It’s Hearsay”: Hearsay and Evidence in the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT), Sans (Oct. 20, 2004), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/
whitepapers/legal/hearsay-evidence-computer-emergency-response-team-cert-1541 [https://
perma.cc/A6W4-W3V7] (“Computer-generated records contain the output of computer in-
structions without manual intervention. This fails the hearsay definition . . . because in com-
puter-generated records, a ‘person’ is not making an assertion. . . . On the other hand,
computer-stored information can be based on human generated contents. . . . If the person
that entered the information does not testify . . . the computer-stored information is consid-
ered hearsay.”).
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In contrast, when a laboratory technician participates in the data-collec-
tion process—either by inputting the photo or video evidence to be
processed or by enhancing the facial image to ensure accurate identifica-
tion—this additional human interaction with the computer affects the re-
sult.196 Under these circumstances, it is the forensic technician’s input that
gives life to the computer’s otherwise-automated programming and—in no
small sense—determines the result that is generated.197 In such a case, “[t]he
test results, although computer-generated, [are] produced with the assis-
tance and input of the technicians and must therefore be attributed to the
technicians.”198
Similarly, when a laboratory technician verifies the results of a facial
recognition analysis, she inserts her statements into the process. A unique
feature of facial recognition analysis is that the results can, in most instances,
be verified by a technician. Indeed, some facial recognition systems require
human verification.199 While a technician cannot, without the aid of scien-
tific techniques and devices, determine whether a particular blood sample
contains alcohol,200 the same technician may conduct at least a basic visual
analysis to confirm the results of a facial recognition match. Such analysis
provides another possible entry point for human statements into the facial
recognition process.
In sum, certain facial recognition systems may be categorically beyond
the reach of the Confrontation Clause because they do not contain human
statements.201 But, those facial recognition systems within the scope of this
Note do contain human statements made out of court. Thus, if facial recog-
nition evidence is offered by a prosecutor to prove the truth of the matter
196. See Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 65 (noting that reliance on human employees
can affect the outcome of false positives).
197. Cf. Washington, 498 F.3d at 233 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“In light of the significant
role that the technician plays in conducting the test and generating accurate results, the results
cannot be attributed solely to the machine.”).
198. Id. at 232–33.
199. For a visual representation of this process, see Anil K. Jain et al., Mich. State Univ.
Biometrics Research Grp., Face Recognition: Some Challenges in Forensics, Biometrics Re-
search Group (2011), http://biometrics.cse.msu.edu/Presentations/JainKlarePark_Forensic
FR_IEEE_FG.pdf [perma.cc/6LGV-UXAC].
200. Washington, 498 F.3d at 230 (“The ‘statement’ that Washington’s blood contained
PCP and alcohol is a conclusion drawn only from the machines’ data, and its source was
independent of human observation or reporting. Only the machine, through its diagnostic and
technical process, could provide facts about the chemical composition of Washington’s
blood.”).
201. Admittedly, there is a colorable argument that the algorithm contains the statements
of its programmer. See Poorbaugh, supra note 195, at 226 (“A . . . significant argument for
distinguishing computer-generated evidence from other evidence generated by inanimate ob-
jects is the fact that computers are programmed by humans.”). This Note adopts the Fourth
Circuit’s position that fully automated facial recognition systems do not contain hearsay state-
ments. The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear Washington shortly after it decided Bullcoming
may indicate support of this perspective. See Washington v. United States, 557 U.S. 934 (2009).
Confrontation Clause challenges to the admissibility of evidence produced by automated facial
recognition systems would have to refute the reasoning of Washington.
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asserted in those statements—that is, the defendant is the person that the
facial recognition system identified from the photo or video input—then it
is hearsay.202 And, if the facial recognition evidence is testimonial, the Con-
frontation Clause will apply.
2. Facial Recognition Evidence Will Almost Always Be Offered
for Its Truth
In order to be hearsay, an out-of-court statement must be offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted therein.203 Facial recognition evidence
will, in almost any conceivable case today, be offered in this manner. This is
because, first, the primary purpose of facial recognition evidence (and thus
the most common purpose for which it would be offered in a criminal pros-
ecution) will usually be to prove that the defendant is the individual pic-
tured in an underlying photo or video.204 And, second, the evidence itself
will usually purport to show that the defendant is the person pictured in an
underlying photo or video, a classic truth-of-the-matter-asserted purpose.
The Williams plurality introduced the possibility, however, that a labo-
ratory report is not offered for its truth when the substance of a lab report is
merely relied upon by an expert witness to form her own opinion.205 Such a
rule, if valid, could conceivably bring facial recognition evidence outside the
scope of Confrontation Clause protection if the prosecution does not intro-
duce the evidence, but instead introduces its substance through the testi-
mony of a witness. There are two reasons to believe, however, that the
rationale of the Williams plurality will not apply to facial recognition
evidence.
First, and most obviously, a majority of the Court rejected the plural-
ity’s rationale in this regard.206 Five justices recognized that “the supposed
distinction between admission for the truth and admission in support of the
expert’s opinion is non-existent when the statement supports the opinion
only if true.”207 Thus, the Williams decision does not, as a matter of binding
precedent, allow the prosecution to sneak the evidence in using another ex-
pert’s testimony.208 Indeed, if the plurality’s analysis were the rule, the
202. For a discussion of why facial recognition data will almost always be offered for its
truth, see Section III.A.2 below.
203. Fisher, supra note 84 at 379.
204. One possible non-hearsay use, however, would be to explain the course of an investi-
gation—for example, to show why the police followed a particular lead or procedures with
regards to a criminal defendant. See, e.g., State v. Batchelor, 690 S.E.2d 53, 56 (N.C. Ct. App.
2010) (holding that an officer’s statements were offered to explain his presence at a particular
location, rather than to prove that the defendant was a drug dealer).
205. See discussion supra, Section II.C.
206. See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.
207. Richard D. Friedman, Thoughts on Williams, Part I: Reasons to Think the Impact May
Be Limited, Confrontation Blog (June 19, 2012, 7:52 AM), http://confrontationright.blog
spot.com/2012/06/thoughts-on-williams-part-i-reasons-to.html [http://perma.cc/8SDL-AJBE].
208. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
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“Clause would be rendered a virtual nullity: A witness could make a testi-
monial statement in writing out of court, and then another witness could
testify at trial as to the substance of the statement.”209
For this reason, courts have divided on whether to apply the plurality’s
reasoning.210 Several courts have declined to apply Williams altogether,
agreeing with Justice Kagan that Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming provide the
controlling standard.211 Indeed, the opinions in Williams indicate that if the
question were cleanly presented, the Supreme Court would likely find that
such a statement is hearsay when relied upon by an expert witness.
Second, the question of whether the Supreme Court will embrace the
expert-testimony work-around may prove largely academic, however, be-
cause of a key difference between facial recognition evidence and other fo-
rensic laboratory tests: facial recognition tests are much more readily
replicable.
Consider for a moment the multiple places, described in Section I.C
above, where human statements can be inserted into the facial recognition
testing process. A laboratory technician will be required to insert the photo
or image into the facial recognition system. The technician may have to opti-
mize the photo or video for face detection. The technician may have to set
distance values for the matching algorithm or use visual confirmation to
verify the results. And it is highly likely that a single analyst would perform
all of these functions.212
An expert witness called to testify about facial recognition technology
could easily perform these functions using the same digital file and in a
relatively short period of time.213 Therefore, unlike a DNA test, where the
process requires both the original sample214 and an onerous multi-step anal-
ysis,215 the expert who is called to testify on facial recognition evidence
209. Brief for Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, Wil-
liams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (No. 10-8505).
210. Compare United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1229–35 (11th Cir. 2012), and
United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 70–72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) with Marshall v. People, 309 P.3d
943, 946–48 (Colo. 2013), and State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 651 (N.J. 2014). This divide has
spawned three petitions for certiorari. United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273 (C.A.A.F. 2015),
petition for cert. filed, No. 15-405 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2015); State v. Brewington, 743 S.E.2d 626 (N.C.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2660 (2014); State v. Griep, 863 N.W.2d 567 (Wis. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S.Ct. 793 (2016).
211. See supra note 178.
212. See infra notes 247–249 and accompanying text; supra Section I.C.
213. See John Dowden, Facial Recognition: The Most “Natural” Forensic Technology, Evi-
dence Tech. Mag., http://www.evidencemagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&
task=view&id=1344 [http://perma.cc/5TUY-AADY].
214. Since the photos and videos are stored and analyzed digitally, the original photo-
graph is not necessary. The Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence indicates
that the use of a digital copy of the file would go to the new test’s weight, not its admissibility.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009).
215. Although some machines can analyze DNA in as little as 90 minutes, most crime labs
use a process that is more time-intensive. See Ben Lockhart, New DNA Testing Could Take
Hours, Not Weeks, Deseret News (Mar. 24, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/
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could, with little extra effort, create a new statement—her own test results—
that would be offered for its truth. This procedure would also simultane-
ously satisfy the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights by forcing the de-
clarant herself to appear in court for cross-examination.
Because of the ease of retesting and the need to call an expert anyway,
the prosecution would thus save few to no resources by having the expert
rely on another’s opinion, rather than simply conducting the facial recogni-
tion analysis again herself. The enhanced credibility of an expert with per-
sonal knowledge of the instant case would also incentivize prosecutors to use
this method.
The Confrontation Clause would continue to operate by allowing the
defendant to cross-examine the testifying expert witness, identify flaws in
the expert’s process, and expose a history of mistakes that could be evaluated
by the jury. In short, regardless of whether the introduction of a testimonial
statement via an expert witness is a viable option for prosecutors, they are
likely to call a witness who will offer his or her own statement for its truth,
simultaneously satisfying the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.
Therefore, as a practical matter, facial recognition evidence will rarely be
offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted
therein.
B. Facial Recognition Evidence Is Testimonial
Facial recognition evidence is testimonial under the Crawford frame-
work for two reasons.216 First, the evidence satisfies the primary purpose
test217 as evidence prepared for prosecution. Second, the Supreme Court’s
basis for finding laboratory reports testimonial in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming applies with equal force to facial recognition evidence.
1. Primary Purpose Test
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that statements made “with
the primary purpose of creating evidence” are testimonial.218 Facial recogni-
tion evidence is thus properly classified as testimonial because the primary
purpose of the evidence is to identify the perpetrator of a crime for the
purposes of prosecution.
article/865576611/New-DNA-testing-could-take-hours-not-weeks.html [http://perma.cc/
5ZP4-FL7K].
216. This analysis ignores circumstances where facial recognition test results are contained
in formalized affidavits, which would clearly rank as testimonial under Crawford. See supra
notes 133–138 and accompanying text. Such affidavits are “functionally identical to live, in-
court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ ” Melendez-Diaz,
557 U.S. at 310–11 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
217. For a discussion of the Court’s application of the primary purpose test, see Section
II.B.1 above.
218. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).
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This interpretation accords with both the subjective and objective meth-
ods of interpreting the primary purpose test advanced by Justices Scalia and
Sotomayor, respectively, in Michigan v. Bryant.219 When a technician
processes a piece of photo or video evidence using a facial recognition pro-
gram, she is clearly subjectively aware that the evidence will likely be used in
trial. The context of submitting evidence to a crime laboratory or other law
enforcement investigatory unit for analysis necessarily contemplates its use
in prosecution. This same reasoning would satisfy the objective inquiry: the
results of such a test are “made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.”220 The test results are documents prepared for an
“evidentiary purpose,” and are thus testimonial.221
The plurality’s opinion in Williams does not change this result. Accord-
ing to the plurality, a laboratory report is nontestimonial if it is “not pre-
pared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual.”222 The
plurality emphasized the fact that the Cellmark technicians only produced
an anonymous DNA profile, rather than identifying a particular suspect.223
Therefore, according to the plurality, the primary purpose of the state crime
lab in sending the sample to Cellmark was to “catch a dangerous rapist who
was still at large,”224 rather than to obtain evidence for trial.
Facial recognition evidence is readily distinguishable from the circum-
stance relied upon by the Williams plurality, however. This is because, by the
time a facial recognition analysis is conducted, the police have targeted an
individual: the person pictured in the photo or video. An analyst who
processes the facial recognition evidence will have seen the face of the person
who will be prosecuted. The act of confirming the legal identity of this per-
son does not change the fact that the analyst already knows who will be
accused. This is different from the DNA context, where the analyst could not
derive meaningful identification information from her own sensory observa-
tion of the sample, which in many cases will be nothing more than a small
quantity of hair, blood, or semen. By the time the police have transmitted an
image to the laboratory for facial recognition, the police inquiry should be
focused enough to satisfy the Williams plurality.225
At a minimum, this feature of facial recognition technology undercuts
one of the key rationales offered by the plurality: the near impossibility of
219. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text.
220. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (emphasis added).
221. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–11.
222. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012).
223. Id. at 2243–44.
224. Id. at 2243.
225. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round Four,
45 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 51, 59–61 (2012) [hereinafter Friedman, Confrontation and Lab Reports]
(discussing that knowledge about the actual individual may be sufficiently “targeted” even
though in Williams, the fact that the lab workers could not have known that the DNA sample
would inculpate someone in the database was not sufficiently accusatory).
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fraud where the technician could not have known the identity of the defen-
dant. The Williams plurality stressed that “no one at Cellmark could have
possibly known that the profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate
petitioner . . . . Under these circumstances, there was no ‘prospect of
fabrication’ and no incentive to produce anything other than a scientifically
sound and reliable profile.”226 But the same cannot be said about an analyst
who is asked to conduct a facial recognition analysis on a photo or video. If
the photo depicts the analyst’s mother committing a crime, for example, the
analyst may well have incentive to fabricate or distort the results.
Moreover, the Williams plurality’s rationale clearly does not apply in
cases where facial recognition technology is used to distinguish between
photos of two similar-looking, known suspects. The example in this Note’s
Introduction is illustrative: imagine that the prosecution had used the tech-
nology to compare mugshots of both Darrin and Damien Fernandez to the
hypothetical security camera footage. The identities of both Fernandez
brothers would be known to the analysts in this situation. It remains to be
seen how often such uses will arise, but it stands to reason that the technol-
ogy will be deployed to distinguish between known defendants with some
frequency, given the technology’s marked superiority to the human eye.227
In any event, under the Supreme Court’s own precedents, the plurality
in Williams is “of questionable precedential value, largely because a majority
of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality.”228 Even
if the plurality’s test did apply to facial recognition technology, the test itself
is subject to substantial criticism. Scholars and the dissenting justices in Wil-
liams have attacked the test as flying in the face the Court’s precedents and
the text of the Clause itself.229 For these reasons, as Justice Kagan indicated in
her Williams dissent,230 Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming likely provide the
proper doctrinal analysis.231 The next section of this Note thus applies this
precedent to facial recognition evidence, which further bolsters the conclu-
sion that such evidence is testimonial.
2. Specific Application of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming
The Court’s key Confrontation Clause opinions addressing forensic lab-
oratory reports—Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming—preclude four additional
possible objections to the testimonial nature of facial recognition evidence:
the accusatory-witness argument, the neutral-scientific-testing argument,
the increased-prosecutorial-burden argument, and the reliability argument.
226. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243–44 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 359
(2011)).
227. See Lu & Tang, supra note 19.
228. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996) (citing Nichols v. United
States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994)).
229. See, e.g., Friedman, Confrontation and Lab Reports, supra note 225, at 58–60 (attack-
ing the targeted individual test on these grounds).
230. See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
231. See supra, note 176 and accompanying text.
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In Melendez-Diaz, the Court explicitly rebuffed three major arguments
that forensic testimony is not testimonial.232 First, it rejected the State’s con-
tention that the analysts are not “accusatory” witnesses, and therefore not
subject to the Confrontation Clause. According to the State, the analysts
were not directly accusing Melendez-Diaz of wrongdoing, and “their testi-
mony [wa]s inculpatory only when taken together with other evidence link-
ing petitioner to the contraband.”233 The Court flatly rejected this argument:
The text of the Amendment contemplates two classes of witnesses—those
against the defendant and those in his favor. The prosecution must produce
the former; the defendant may call the latter. Contrary to respondent’s
assertion, there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecu-
tion, but somehow immune from confrontation.234
Thus, it is no objection to the testimonial nature of facial recognition evi-
dence to say that the photograph or video depicting the defendant, rather
than the facial recognition analysis, is doing the accusing. The fact that a
human technician was required to generate the test result creates a witness
whom the defendant is entitled to confront.
Second, the Melendez-Diaz Court also dismissed the idea that the ana-
lysts’ certifications should not be considered under Crawford’s testimonial
framework because they are the “resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing.”235
The Court acknowledged that “there are other ways—and in some cases
better ways—to challenge or verify the results of a forensic test. But the
Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation. We do not have license to
suspend the Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is availa-
ble.”236 The Court reiterated that, because the Clause is a procedural—not
substantive—guarantee, the reliability of the evidence does not bear on
whether confrontation is required.237 This ensures that, as facial recognition
technology continues to improve in terms of algorithm effectiveness, facial-
print-processing capacity, and database size, the defendant’s right to con-
frontation will remain. This will prove critically important as facial recogni-
tion technology gains acceptance in courtrooms.
Additionally, the Melendez-Diaz Court confirmed that any increased
prosecutorial burden resulting from confrontation has no bearing on the
proper constitutional analysis. “The Confrontation Clause may make the
prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the
232. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313, 317, 325 (2009).
233. Id. at 314.
234. Id. at 313–14 (internal citation omitted).
235. Id. at 317 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 29, Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 (No. 07-
591)).
236. Id. at 318 (internal citation omitted).
237. Id. at 317–18. The majority also challenged the State’s characterization of forensic
tests as neutral and reliable. To the contrary, Justice Scalia wrote, confrontation may provide
significant value, because human judgments are involved in scientific tests and cross-examina-
tion may reveal incompetence or procedural missteps. Id. at 317–21.
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right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Con-
frontation Clause—like those other constitutional provisions—is binding,
and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”238 Additionally, Melendez-
Diaz’s ability to subpoena the analysts “whether pursuant to state law or the
Compulsory Process Clause—is no substitute for the right of confronta-
tion.”239 The burden of presenting testimonial witnesses squarely rests on the
prosecution, not the defendant.240
Finally, the Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that the testimonial
nature of evidence is tied to the evidence’s reliability. As the Bullcoming
Court held: “[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report
drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amend-
ment bar.”241 Therefore, the perceived accuracy of facial recognition systems
is immaterial for testimonial classification. Together, these two definitive
holdings—rejecting the touchstones of reliability and prosecutorial bur-
den—insulate facial recognition technology against major challenges to its
testimonial nature.
In sum, facial recognition evidence is testimonial in nature under any
formulation of the primary purpose test as articulated by the Supreme
Court since Crawford. Moreover, the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence has demonstrated that, if a laboratory report has the “ ‘primary pur-
pose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution,’ ” it is testimonial.242 Because facial recognition evi-
dence is testimonial hearsay, confrontation is required and will restrict the
manner by which prosecutors may introduce the evidence against criminal
defendants.
C. Implications for the Admissibility of Facial Recognition Evidence
Because facial recognition evidence is hearsay and testimonial, prosecu-
tors seeking to admit the evidence must take steps to satisfy a criminal de-
fendant’s Confrontation Clause right.
The simplest solution is for the declarant to appear for cross-examina-
tion at trial.243 In the context of facial recognition evidence, the declarant
would be the technician who conducted the facial recognition analysis.244 As
238. Id. at 325.
239. Id. at 324.
240. Id. at 324–25 (“More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on
the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses
into court.”).
241. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011).
242. Id. at 2714 n.6 (plurality opinion in part) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 822 (2006)). Although footnote six of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion was not joined by a
majority of the court, it was joined by all the Justices who apply the primary purpose test.
243. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“[W]hen the declarant appears
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use
of his prior testimonial statements.”).
244. See discussion supra Section I.C.
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Melendez-Diaz makes clear, once a laboratory report is deemed testimonial,
the burden of producing the declarant rests on the prosecution, not on the
criminal defendant.245 Bullcoming further established that “[t]he prosecution
cannot satisfy the Confrontation Clause by presenting a lab report through
an analyst from the lab who had no role in performance of the test that is
the subject of the report.”246 Simply put, the prosecution presumptively must
present the analyst who performed the facial recognition test in order to
satisfy Confrontation.
Unlike DNA evidence, where a multitude of laboratory analysts may be
involved in the processing of a single test kit,247 facial recognition evidence is
likely to contain the statements of a single, clearly identifiable declarant. This
is because forensic applications of facial recognition technology require a
limited number of human steps, which can easily be conducted by one per-
son.248 The most significant act in the analysis—inputting the photo or
video into the facial recognition program—is necessarily conducted by a
single technician.249 Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming thus establish that this
technician—the analyst who played by far the most significant role in pro-
duction of the evidence—is the declarant who must testify in court.250
Prosecutors may attempt to skirt this requirement in a number of ways.
As described in Section III.A.2 above, introduction of facial recognition evi-
dence via expert testimony may present one route to admissibility but is, on
the whole, unlikely to remain viable in the future. In the interest of expedi-
ence or perhaps to secure prosecutorial leniency, defendants may waive their
Confrontation Clause rights.251 States may pass notice-and-demand statutes,
which require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its in-
tent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant
is given a period of time in which he can demand the analyst’s appearance
live at trial.252 By passing such statutes, states can generally compel criminal
245. See supra notes 233–234 and accompanying text.
246. Richard D. Friedman, Potential Responses to the Melendez-Diaz Line of Cases, 90
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, 2011, at 396.
247. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 10 (R.I. 2012) (noting that at Orchid Cellmark of
Dallas, Texas, “it is not typical for one person to perform each step of the process . . . . Instead,
Cellmark uses a ‘team format,’ with different analysts performing each step”).
248. See discussion supra Section I.C.
249. See discussion supra Section I.C.
250. It is admittedly conceivable that other technicians could be involved in the evidence’s
production. This may create more complex chain of custody and declarant identity issues—
beyond the scope of this Note—that have not yet been addressed by the Supreme Court.
251. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313–14, 314  n.3 (2009) (“The right
to confrontation may, of course, be waived . . . .”). This can be accomplished through forfei-
ture by wrongdoing, by the defendant’s failure to object to the offending evidence, by stipula-
tion in a plea bargain or at trial, or by certain State procedural rules governing the exercise of
objections. Id. at 314 n.3; see also id. at 355 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Giles v. California, 554
U.S. 353, 359 (2008).
252. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326. For an illustrative discussion of North Carolina’s
Notice and Demand Statutes, see Jessica Smith, Understanding the New Confrontation Clause
Analysis: Crawford, Davis, and Melendez-Diaz, Admin. Just. Bull., UNC School of Gov’t
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defendants to exercise or else waive their Confrontation Clause rights before
trial.253
The long-term feasibility of these workarounds remains to be seen. One
thing is certain, however: as facial recognition evidence increases in accu-
racy, prosecutors will continue to seek innovative paths to admissibility. For-
tunately, because facial recognition evidence is testimonial, the
Confrontation Clause will continue to protect defendants’ weighty interests
in probing its veracity. It is thus incumbent upon courts to recognize that
interest and ensure that prosecutorial convenience does not come at the ex-
pense of a fair trial in the manner guaranteed by the Constitution.
Conclusion
The Crawford Court breathed new life into the Confrontation Clause,
defending the Founders’ notion of the Sixth Amendment right and af-
firming the integral place of cross-examination in the criminal trial. Al-
though the Founders could never have imagined facial recognition
technology, much less considered its application when drafting the Consti-
tution, the principles that animated the Confrontation Clause demand that
criminal defendants faced with such evidence be allowed to face their ac-
cuser. Although the Court has fractured around competing meanings of the
requirement that evidence be testimonial in order to trigger the confronta-
tion right, the currently predominant forms of facial recognition evidence
are testimonial under any formulation of the primary purpose test. Con-
frontation is thus required and, except for a few narrow exceptions, the de-
clarant—here, the analyst who conducted the facial recognition analysis—
must testify in Court.
As the Court has affirmed, the Confrontation Clause is a procedural,
not substantive, right. It “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination.”254 As facial recognition technology continues to im-
prove and becomes more prevalent, we can expect prosecutorial use to in-
crease as well. Fortunately, criminal defendants armed with a constitutional
right to cross-examination will be able to uncover mistaken applications of
this technology. This procedure—presentation of evidence by the prosecu-
tion and probing of evidence by the defendant—preserves the trial form so
valued by the Founders: one that emphasizes the central role of cross-exami-
nation, “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”255
21–25 (2010), http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/aojb1002.pdf [http://perma.cc/
W256-T44W].
253. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327 (“There is no conceivable reason why [a criminal
defendant] cannot . . . be compelled to exercise his Confrontation Clause rights before trial.”).
254. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
255. 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367 (James H.
Chadbourn rev. 1974).
